Annie B. Evans v. Morgan Evans : Brief of Appellant on Motion for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Annie B. Evans v. Morgan Evans : Brief of Appellant
on Motion for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick H. Fenton; Attorney for Appellant;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation





In The \ ~I 1\ . , . ~ · · .' ' 
\~~· 
~upreme Court of the State of Utah 
·I 





1 •, ' ;: <I i 
I 
~ 
~NIE B. EVANS, Administratrix of the 
I 
~tate of William H. Evans, Deceased, 




40RGAN EVANS, ON MOTION 
Defendant & Appellant. FOR REHEARING 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PATRICK H. FENTON, 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF POINT:S ---------------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Point 1. The decision of the Supreme Court filed 8 July 
1958 fails to answer Roint No. 1 of the appeal ________ 4 
Point 2. A trial court has a duty to enfiorce ethical 
standards of the Bar and to stop violations of 
same committed in the court's presence ____________________ 6 
CONCLUSIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
Ti tie 78-51-26 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Ti tie 78-51-19 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Ti tie 78-32-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Ti tie 78-32-11 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
CASES CITED 
Higgins vs. Burton, Judge 
64 Utah 562, 232 P. 914 -------------------------------------------------- 8 
Wilson vs. Wahl 
182 Kansas 532, 322 P 2d 804 ---------------------------------------- 8 
State of Kansas vs. Leigh 
178 Kansas 549, 289 P 2d 77 4 -------------------------------------- 9 
TEXTS CITED 
The Utah Bar Bulletin, November, 1952: 
The Revised Rules .of the Utah State Bar Governing 
Professional Conduct and Discipline -------------------------- 5 
The Utah Bar Bulletin, November, 1952: 
Canons of Judicial Ethics ------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Corpus Juris Secundum: 
Volume 7, Page 845 ------------------------------------------ _________ ---~ _ 9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ANNIE B. EVANS, Administratrix of the 
Estate of William H. Evans, Deceased, 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
vs 
MORGAN EVANS, 







-PATRICK H. FENTON, 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was tried before a jury commencing on 
Thursday, 14 November, 1957, and concluding on Mon-
day, 18 November, 1957. William H. Evans, deceased, had 
been married to Annie B. Evans during his lifetime a·nd 
left Annie B. Evans as his widow at the time of his death. 
The defendant and appellant, Morgan Evans, was the 
brother of William H. Evans, deceased. During the life-
time of William H. Evans, deceased, said William H. 
Evans and his wife had lived the major portion of their 
married life in houses belonging to Morgan Evans. 
In her comp~laint the plaintiff asked for the owner-
ship of one half of certain cattle branded 44. The defend-
ant denied that the plaintiff owned any interest in said 
cattle in his answer and cross complaint, but admitted 
that certain grazing rights and farm land that had been 
used in connection with said cattle were jointly owned by 
the defendant and William H. Evans, deceased, during 
the lifetime of said William H. Evans, deceased. Defend-
ant also asked for the partition of the farm land. De-
fendant also had an alternative prayer whereby defend-
ant asked the trial court, in the event said trial court 
found on the ownership of cattle issue for the plaintiff, 
for money expended in caring for said cattle. Both par-
ties joined in asking the court to sell said farm land and 
to divide the money derived therefrom. 
Durham Morris, Esquire, attorney for the plaintiff, 
had entered in the employment of William H. Evans, de-
ceased, and Morgan Evans, prior to the death of said 
William H. Evans, deceased, to arrange a collection of 
certain money from D. G. Page, and did so, and was to 
follow up the collection and was to receive 25% of said 
items for his services. That the last payment thereunder 
was received under the terms of said settlement in 1958 
and after deducting 25% therefrom said attorney paid 
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the balance over to the parties herein named. That until 
this last playment was collected in 1958 and disbursed 
said attorney was employed from several years prior to 
the commencement of this action to the time of said dis-
bursement by said William H. Evans, deceased, and Mor~ 
gan Evans. That at the time this action was commenced 
by said attorney the D. G. Page item was not completed, 
and said attorney, Durham Morris, at the time he com-
menced the above entitled action, as attorney for the 
plaintiff, was actually employed by the defendant, Mor-
ga·n Evans, in a professional capacity as an attorney at 
law to complete the collection of the The D. G. Page 
item. And that after the trial of the above entitled ac-
tion said attorney completed the D. G. Page item by col-
lecting the last payment to become due on the D. G. Page 
item, deducting his 25% thereof, and then paying the bal-
ance to the parties of this action. _That Morgan Evans 
received his money out of said payment, after the filing 
of notice of appeal in the above entitled matter. That 
until the payment of said money Durham Morris, Esquire, 
was employed by l\iorgan Evans, the defendant above 
named, as an attorney to perform a professional job, until 
after notice of appeal in this rna tter was filed. 
During the trial of the above entitled matter, said 
Attorney, Durham IVI:orris, Esquire, volunteered 1nany 
items as exhibits, that came into his possession as attor-
ney in the D. G. Page item, without the consent of Mor-
gan Evans and over his objection. That this action pre-
judiced the jury to such a point that a fair and impartial 
trial was not had. That at the time these items \Yere vol-
unteered they were volunteered by an attorney employed 
by Morgan Evans and said items had been turned to 
said attorney as part of his then existing employment by 
Morgan Evans. That when these items and actions were 
objected to on the basis of an existing attorney and client 
relationship and that said items were being volunteered 
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out of an existing attorney and client relationship the 
trial court overruled the objections and allowed said ex-
hibits to go to the jury. 
The jury found for the plaintiff on most issues with 
some monetary items to the defendant to pay for the ex-
penses he had incurred in runni'ng said cattle. The jury 
found that each of the parties owned an undivided one-
half interest in said cattle. 
That all the evidence the plaintiff presented was 
either turned to said attorney through the D. G. Page 
item, or the existance of said evidence ascertained 
through familiarity with the D. G. Page item. 
That on appeal the defendant presented two points: 
1. That the trial court erred in allowing this matter to be 
presented to the jury at all after the disclosure of an 
existing attorney and client relationship between the 
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant, and, 2. That the 
trial court erred in failing to allow a portion of defend-
ant's objection to plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements. 
That in its decision filed 8 July, 1958, the Supreme 
Court of Utah affirmed the trial court except as to point 
No.2. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The decision of the Supreme Court filed 8 July, 
1958 fails to answer Point No. 1 of the appeal. 
2. A trial court has a duty to enforce ethical stand-
ards of the Bar and to stop violations of same committed 
in the court's presence. 
ARGUMENT 
1. That the decision of the Supreme Court filed 8 
July, 1958, fails to answer point No: 1 of the appeal. 
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Point No. 1 as raised by the appeal was "The trial 
court erred in allowing this matter to be presented to the 
jury at all after the disclosure of an existing attorney 
and client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney 
a·nd the defendant." 
The undersigned's examination of said decision en-
tirely fails to find an answer to this question. Apparent-
ly the Supreme Court based its decision upon violation 
of the confidences, as did the trial court that tried the 
matter and did ·not rule upon the question of whether or 
not the trial court erred in allowing the rna tter to be 
presented to the jury after the disclosure of an existin~ 
attorney and client relationship. 
No one can question the existance of an attorney and 
client re'lationship between Durham Morris, Esquire, and 
Morgan Evans, at the time of the filing of the complaint 
and the trial on the above entitled matter. At the time 
of the identification of Exhibit "1" shown on page 9, Line 
11 of the transcript of trial and continuing therein to 
page 13, line 26, the attorney and client relationship was 
defi'nitely shown. This was within the first 30 minutes 
of the presention of the evidence. At that time it was 
clearly shown by vior dire that the exhibit was bein~ 
volunteered out of an existing attorney and client rela-
tionship and without the consent of Morgan Evans. For 
four days of trial work this continued. 
No one can question that this conduct was a serious 
violations of the ethical standards of the Utah State Bar. 
The following quotations are taken from the Revised 
Rules of the Utah State Bar governing professional Con-
duct and Discipline as adopted May 28, 1936, and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah March 
1, 1937, with amendments effective March 29, 1940 and 
June 18, 1952 as published in the November 1952 issue 
of "The Utah Bar Bulletin." 
"Rule III, Conduct prescribed by rule." 
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"6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests." 
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to 
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his rela-
tions to the parties, and and interest in or connection 
\vith the controversy which might influence the client in 
the selection of counsel. 
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting inter-
ests, except by express consent of all concerned given 
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning 
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests 
when in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for 
that which duty to another client requires him to op-
pose." 
Under these circumstances there can be no question 
that at the time of the trial of this case before a Beaver 
County Jury, when there was an admitted attorney and 
client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney and 
the defendant that a serious ethical violation on con-
flict of interests was brought to light and objected to 
and the trial court overruled the objection. The Suprerne 
Court's decision filed 8 July, 1958, does not discuss thi.s 
conflict of interest question but is based upon violation 
of confidences instead. There is no question that Point 
No. 1 of the appeal has not been answered by the Su-
prement Court decision. 
2. A trial court has a duty to enforce ethical stand-
ards of the Bar and to stop violations of same committed 
in the court's presence. 
Most ethical violations are committed outside the 
courtroom and under circumstances that usually a court 
never becomes aware of. However, in this matter the 
violation was brought out and shov1s as a matter of re-
cord. The trial court became aware of same in the early 
hours of the trial. This then raises the question as to the 
duty of the trial court regarding attorneys committing 
ethical violations in the court's presence. Reference is 
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made to Canons of Judicial Ethics, adoped at the annual 
meeting of the Utah State Bar on June 15, 1951, and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah June 
18, 1952 as published in the November 1952 issue of the 
Utah Bar Bulletin. On page 18 is the following: 
"No. 11, Unprofessional Conduct of Attorneys and 
Counsel. · 
A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticize 
and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and 
counsellors, brought to his attention; and if adverse com-
ment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter 
at once to the proper investigating and disciplinary auth-
orities." 
At the time of the trial of this matter the trial judge 
not only failed to follow this requirement but overruled 
objections based upon this requirement and condoned a 
continued conflict of interest to the irreparable damage 
of the defendant. 
Trial judges have authority to regulate their courts 
and punish improper conduct of attorneys committed in 
the court's presence, both statutory and common law. 
Utah ·code Annotated 1953, Title 78-51-26, "Duties 
of Attorneys and Counsellors. It is the duty of an attorn-
ney and counsellor." 
"(9) to comply with all duls approved rules and 
regulations prescribed by the board of commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar and to pay the fees provided by law." 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Title 78-51-19. "Review 
by Supreme Court. Inhere·nt .powers of courts not affected. 
Upon the making of any order by the board recommend-
ing the discipline, suspension or disbarment of any mem-
ber of the Utah State Bar from the practice of law, the 
board shall cause a certified copy thereof to be filed with 
the clerk of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may 
review the action of the board, and may on its own mo-
tion and without the certification of any record inquire 
into the merits of the case, and take any action agree-
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able to its judgment. Nothing in this title contained 
shall be construed as limiting or altering the powers of 
the courts to disbar or discipline members of the bar. 
In addition the power of contempt may be used in a 
r:1a tter of this nature. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Title 78-32-1. "Acts and 
Omissions constituting contempt. The following acts or 
omissions in respect to a court or preceedings therein are 
contempt of the authority of the courts: 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or 
violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, 
or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial 
or ministerial service." 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, T1tle 78-32-11. ''Dam-
ages to party aggrieved. If an actual loss or injury to a 
party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to 
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the court, 
in addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for 
the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person 
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of 
money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his 
costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of 
money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved 
party for such loss and injury." 
The supreme court of the state of Utah has upheld 
the power of a trial court to discipline attorneys. In the 
case of Higgins vs. Burton, Judge, 64 Utah 562, 232 I). 
914 Higgins had been denied the right to practice in the 
Fifth District Court for an act or acts not discussed but 
for which there had been no heari'ng. The Supreme Court 
held that the trial judge had this power but not without 
a hearing. 
Other states have held that an attorney should dis-
qualify himself on a conflict of interest matter and that 
if he does not do so that the trial judge should stop sai.d 
attorney from appearing. Kansas has so ruled on both 
civil and criminal rna tters. In Wilson vs. Wahl, 182 Kansa.s 
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532 322 P2d. 804 in a' matter in which arose out of an ex· 
plosion when Wilson a·nd others lived in a building that 
was damaged by what was apparently a natural gas ex~ 
plosion attributed to a leak in lines of city of Lyons, Kan-
sas.Wahl filed statutory claim for Wilson and others and 
then appeared at the trial as special counsel for the city. 
The Kansas Court held that Wahl should have disquali-
fied himself and that upon his failure to do so the trial 
court should have disqualified him. In State of Kansas vs. 
Leigh, 178 Kansas, 549 289 P2d. 774 Defendant was charg-
ed with burglary. Attorney, then a candidate for county 
attorney counseled with defendant at request of defend-
ant's wife. Attorney was then elected county attorney 
and appeared as prosecutor. Kansas court held that the 
prosecutor should have disqualified himself and voluntar-
ily withdrawn and that upon his failure to do so, it be-
came the trial court's duty to forbid said attorney further 
participation therein. 
The long standing obligation of the courts to force 
upholding standards of ethics is well expressed in 7 Cor-
pus Juris Secundom, Attorney and Client, Section 58. 
The section commences on page 842, at page 843 is the 
following: 
Attorneys are subject to the supervision and control 
of the courts and the power of the court to make reason-
able rules and regulations regarding the conduct of at-
torneys is not open to question. It is the duty of the 
courts to see to it that attorneys live up to their obliga-
tions, a·nd to see that the profession is confined to pro-
fessional service, by professional means; and to lend no 
sanction to unprofessional service, and it has been held 
the inhere·nt duty of all courts to support the ethical 
standing of the bar by impressing upon its members the 
duty of holding sacred the confidence which should and 
must ever exist between attorney and client. 
The canons of ethics adopted by a bar association, 
\vhile they do not have the effect of statutes, are bind-
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ing on attorneys. The authority of the canons of ethics is 
derived, not from the fact that they are approved by the 
bar association, but because they are statements of prin-
ciples and rules accepted and acknowledged by reputable 
attorneys and are recognized and applied by the courts 
in proper cases." 
Hence a trial court has the duty to enforce the ethi-
cal standards of the bar and to stop attorneys when they 
do not voluntarily withdraw whe:n there develops a con-
flict of interest. In the case at hand when the existing 
attorney and client relationship between plaintiff's at-
torney and the defendant was shown to the trial court, 
when said attorney failed to withdraw the trial court 
had a well established duty to protect said ethical stand-
ards and the trial should have been stopped until other 
counsel became available and the court's failure to stop 
same is error so prejudicial that another trial will not 
cure this matter. Therefore the Supreme Court should 
reverse the trial court entirely and failure to do so puts 
the Supreme Court as well as the trial court in a position 
of condoning ethical misconduct in the presence of the 
court. It cannot be said that ethics do not apply in the 
courtroom. It cannot be said that ethics have ·not been 
violated in the trial court in this matter. It cannot be 
said that the trial court is free from a duty of enforce-
ment when violations of ethics are committeed in the 
presence of the trial court. Yet apparently the trial court 
has failed its duty in this rna tter and has openly con· 
doned injury to a litigant caused by an attorney's con-
flict of interest and appearing against an individual for 
whom said attorney is worki'ng and volunteering exhibits 
and information provided by said litigant in another 
matter on which said attorney is retained and working 
for said litigant. Is this justice? If this is to be condoned 
by the trial court and the Supreme Court of Utah then 
and in that event of what purpose are the Canons of 
ethics? 
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CONCLUSIONS 
That Durham Morris, Esquire, appeared at attornev 
for the plaintiff above named while still working f~r 
and employed by the defendant above named, and was 
paid for work that he did for the defendant, after soap-
pearing. That he volunteered information and exhibits 
gained out of his employment by Morgan Evans and used 
them agai'nst Morgan Evans while still working for Mor-
gan Evans. That he should not have appeared in this 
matter on either side of said action. That in so doing he 
viola ted Rue III, Section 6, Adverse Influence and Con-
flicti'ng interests, of said canons of ethics. That this was 
objected to and the trial court overruled the objections. 
That the trial court has a duty of enforcement of said 
canons of ethics and the trial court's failure to enforce 
same resulted in irreparable damage and injury to the 
defendant Morga:n Evans. That a trial court has a duty to 
enforce ethical standards of the Bar and to stop viola-
tions of same committed in the court's presence. That the 
decision .of the Supreme Court filed 8 July, 1958 fails to 
answer Point No. 1 raised by the appeal. That the trial 
court erred in allowing this matter to be presented to 
the jury at all after the disclosure of an existing attorney 
and client relationship between the plaintiff's attorney 
and the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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